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ARIZONA’S NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUTE:
GUIDANCE ON CLEARING THIS PROCEDURAL HURDLE AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT
Dawinder S. Sidhu†
The Arizona Constitution empowers the legislature to establish
rules for how and under what circumstances the State may be sued.
Pursuant to this constitutional authority, the Arizona State Legislature
enacted Arizona Revised Statutes Section 12-821.01, which requires
those with claims against an Arizona public entity or employee to file
notice of the claims prior to the initiation of legal action.
This procedural prerequisite to initiate a suit may be prudent as
a matter of public policy. In practice, however, the state courts have
been unable to issue reliable decisions with respect to the statute’s
requirements. The state courts’ evolving understanding of the statute
has led to the federal courts delivering inconsistent opinions when faced
with motions to dismiss on notice of claim grounds. As a result,
claimants have not only had their claims thrown out without reaching
the merits, but more critically, the courts have dismissed claims under
a cloud of confusion and uncertainty as how compliance with the
statute may be achieved in a state or federal forum.
The notice of claim statute, as currently interpreted by the courts,
is broken. This article provides guidance on how the statute may be
navigated in consideration of previous pronouncements from the courts,
and how the statute may be fixed to facilitate compliance, while
simultaneously upholding the purposes of the present statute.
Accordingly, Part I provides an overview of the statute, including its
historical development and the justifications for its existence. Part II
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compares the state courts’ and federal courts’ recent treatment of the
statute’s requirements, showing a divergence between the two. Part III
offers litigants guideposts for satisfying the elements of the statute
despite the courts’ unharmonious views on the statute’s content. Part
IV proposes a revised statute to replace the current one, as well as an
amended rule of professional conduct to curb inappropriate attorney
behavior in respect of filing suits against the State.
The current state of the notice of claim statute is sufficiently dire
that legislative action is urgently necessary.
It is hoped that this
article will help practitioners contend with the statute in the meantime,
and will provide useful suggestions to relevant stakeholders when and
if revisions to the existing statute are considered.
*

*

*

INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 2005, Jasper Simmons arrived at the Navajo County
Jail. Eight days later, Jasper attempted suicide by slitting his wrists
with razor blades.2 Prison personnel used medical gauze to dress the
resulting wounds.3 On July 2, 2005, Jasper used the same gauze to
successfully hang himself in his cell–while he was on suicide watch.4
Jasper’s parents filed suit against Navajo County, the State of
Arizona, and others, claiming, inter alia, that that the prison officials
effectively enabled their son to commit suicide with the gauze; that
their son was discovered an hour after he stopped breathing, even
though the prison’s suicide watch protocol required prison guards to
observe Jasper every fifteen minutes; and that Jasper was given
inadequate mental health evaluations–evaluations that somehow
called for Jasper to be under more relaxed suicide watch procedures.5
The complaint pressed six counts of state law negligence and two
counts of state law disability discrimination.6 The court, however,
1

1

Simmons v. Navajo County, No. CV-06-701, 2008 WL 343292, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 2008) .
Id.
3
Simmons v. Navajo County, No. CV-06-701, 2006 WL 1897290, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 11, 2006) .
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at *2.
2

2

dismissed all of these state law claims without considering the merits.7
Why? Jasper’s parents failed to comply with Arizona’s notice of claim
statute.8
This statute, simple as it sounds, requires a person with a claim
against a public entity or public employee to provide notice of the claim
to the public entity or public employee prior to the initiation of legal
action.9 But this statute, however straightforward and sensible it may
seem from a public policy standpoint, has nonetheless proved lethal to
plaintiffs. Its “strict” application has led to the dismissal of state law
claims in a wide range of troubling cases.10 For example, a man who
was struck by a police officer’s vehicle as he walked along a highway,
suffering a broken leg and collarbone as a result, had his state claims
dismissed because he did not comply with the notice of claim
requirements.11 For the same reason, state law claims were swiftly
thrown out in cases where a plaintiff alleged that confidential
information accusing him of child molestation was disclosed without
authorization;12 a plaintiff alleged wrongfully termination in
retaliation for whistle-blowing;13 and a plaintiff alleged racial
discrimination and wrongful accusation of being a serial killer and
rapist.14
This article is focused primarily on two overlapping concerns.
First, how can practitioners, specifically the plaintiffs’ bar, surmount
this rather ominous procedural barrier to relief?15 Second, even if
satisfaction of the statute’s requirements is possible, are there ways in
which the statute may be refined in a manner that clarifies what is
7

Simmons, 2008 WL 343292, at *3-4.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-821.01 (2003); See Simmons, at *4 (“Because Plaintiffs’ state law
claims are barred, the Court will grant summary judgment on those claims.”).
9
Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Houser, 152 P.3d 490, 491 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc).
10
See infra Part II(A).
11
Jones v. Cochise County, No. C20070134, 2007 WL 5734760, (Ariz. Super. Ct. June 21, 2007)
(plaintiffs barred from seeking relief), rev’d, 187 P.3d 97 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
12
Perkins v. Spencer, No. 07-1963, 2008 WL 4418145 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2008).
13
Pitroff v. Yavapai County Bd. of Supervisors, No. 06-1184, 2008 WL 3890496 (D. Ariz. Aug.
21, 2008).
14
Adams v. Shuttleport Ariz. Joint Venture, No. 07-2170, 2008 WL 3843585 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14,
2008).
15
The requirement that a claimant file a notice of claim prior to commencing suit against a public
entity or individual “constitutes a ‘procedural rather than a jurisdictional requirement.’” Konrath
v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist. No. 10, No. 04-179, 2007 WL 2809026, at *17 (D. Ariz. Sept.
26, 2007) (quoting McGrath v. Scott, 250 F.Supp.2d 1218 (D. Ariz. 2003)). This article therefore
refers to the notice of claim statute as a procedural, rather than jurisdictional, issue.
8

3

required of claimants, while still remaining faithful to the statute’s
underlying legislative objectives? This article offers guidance on how
the elements of the notice of claim statute may be met and also
suggests improvements for the state’s existing notice of claim regime.
Tips on how to comply with the statute are needed quite plainly
because the notice of claim statute is responsible for the dispensing of
multiple cases containing serious state claims and demands for
significant damages.16 Indeed, the situation has reached a point where
courts have contemplated whether the statute exists as an
“insurmountable” obstacle for claimants.17
In addition, the Arizona state courts and the Arizona federal
district courts appear to possess divergent interpretations of the notice
of claim requirements,18 which further demonstrates the need for
clarity on the subject. The court opinions that have been issued are
not only difficult to reconcile, but they also have been narrowly
circumscribed to the facts at hand, providing litigants with differing
factual circumstances with limited information on how they can
comply with the statute.19 To make matters worse, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which can provide informative
rulings on the statute, has been largely silent since the state and
federal district courts began issuing unharmonious decisions,20 leaving
the legal landscape in a state of indefinite flux.
16

See Andrew Becke, Comment, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Arizona’s Notice of Claim
Requirements and Statute of Limitations Since the Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity, 39
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247, 259 (2007) (“These dismissals have no relation to the legitimacy of the claim,
the conduct of the state (or its employees), or the severity of injury sustained by the party. It is
simply a method by which a certain percentage of cases can be disposed of regardless of merit.”);
see also id. at 263-64 (“Indeed many of these cases are subject to dismissal [on notice of claim
grounds] based not for lack of merit, but rather because the claimant failed to run to the lawyer's
office as soon as the injury occurred.”).
17
City of Phoenix v. Fields, 193 P.3d 782, 789 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
18
See infra Part II (explaining the difference between Arizona district courts’ and Arizona state
courts’ views of the statute).
19
See, e.g., Otioti v. Arizona, No. 07-443-PHX-SRB, 2008 WL 7069009, at *7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 19,
2008) (a watershed en banc case from the Supreme Court of Arizona “provides no guidance on
what may or may not be sufficient facts beyond the one narrow circumstance of no facts at all.”)
(citation omitted).
20
Indeed, during this time, the Ninth Circuit has not issued any published opinions. It has made
one unpublished ruling of limited precedential value. See Madrid v. County of Apache, 289 F.
App’x 155 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that a notice of claim should have been provided to the
defendant, however the plaintiff had not filed a notice of claim within the established statutory
period).
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As to academic literature, there only are two law review articles
dedicated to the notice of claim statute.21 These articles, however, were
penned before critical developments in the interpretations of the
statute occurred. Other relevant commentary is available, though
these articles address the statute tangentially.22
There are a vast number of Arizona public entities and
employees. Thus, there is great potential for plaintiffs to file state law
claims against the State and for the statute to be implicated thereby.
In fact, the uncertainty over the statute’s requirements has led already
to the courts being “flooded” – in an Arizona court’s own words – with
motions to dismiss on notice of claim grounds.23
The universe of
individuals who can benefit from some direction on the notice of claim
statute is therefore considerable.
Accordingly, Part I will provide an overview of the notice of
claim statute and will discuss the justifications for the statute’s
existence. This broad survey will provide a useful backdrop for
appreciating how the statute has developed over time and for
formulating the contents of any newly proposed notice of claim scheme.
Part II will examine the Arizona state courts’ recent rulings with
respect to the statute. By way of comparison, Part II will also analyze
noteworthy Arizona federal district court opinions in this field. A look
at these state and federal court decisions will reveal how the Arizona
courts’ decisions related to the notice of claim statute have made it
difficult for the federal courts to track Arizona’s understanding of the
statute. As a result, the federal courts have issued more stringent and
inconsistent orders with respect to notices of claim, their good faith
efforts to follow the state courts notwithstanding.
Part III will offer ways in which plaintiffs and their counsel can
still comply with the statute in light of the courts’ dissimilar
interpretations of the statute’s requirements. In particular, this Part
will address when the statute applies, how to serve notice and to whom
notice is to be provided, and how to satisfy the substantive aspects of
the statute.

21

See Tara Zoellner, Note, Lee v. State: The Mailbox Rule and its Applicability to Notices of
Claims Against the State, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 999 (2008); Becke, supra note 16.
22
See, e.g., Gary Newson, Civil Procedure, Service, and the Electronic Courtroom: A Discussion
of the Arizona Supreme Court’s 2006-2007 Decisions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 891 (2008).
23
Backus v. State, 204 P.3d 399, 403 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008), vacated, 203 P.3d 499 (Ariz. 2009).
The Arizona Supreme Court did not disturb this observation
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While compliance may be achieved through the diligent efforts
of claimants, Part IV will argue that the current statute is not worth
saving. It will propose a new notice of claim statute and an amended
rule of professional conduct, which, if implemented, may
simultaneously reduce confusion, ensure more state claims pass
through to the merits stage, and further the established goals of the
existing statute. Part V will conclude this article.24
A remark about what this article does not do: this article
presumes that the statute is valid, and, consequently, does not suggest
ways in which the statute itself may be challenged in the courts.
Those interested in mounting a facial attack on the statute must turn
elsewhere for relevant guidance. In any event, it is unclear whether
the courts would be receptive towards a constitutional objection to the
statute.25
This article also recognizes that “the Arizona Constitution
specifically empowers the legislature to enact statutes of limitations
and procedures that may treat lawsuits against the State differently
from other lawsuits.”26 As such, this article does not assert that the
notice of claim statute, a requirement that applies only to those with

24

A note must be made regarding the sources for and the time within which the author wrote this
article. Ethical considerations compel the author to disclose that he served as a law clerk in an
Arizona federal district court and that he helped resolve cases implicating the notice of claim
statute that is at the core of this piece. This article, however, reflects only the author’s thoughts on
this subject and independent research that he solely performed wholly after the conclusion of his
clerkship. (See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC TRUST: ETHICS FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW
CLERKS 19-20 (2002) (addressing ethical rules for law clerks concerning use of government
resources while serving as a clerk)). It does not contain any information of a confidential nature
and is based exclusively on material that is a matter of public record. (Id. at 7-9 (addressing same
with respect to confidentiality)).
That said, the author decided to write on this topic because of all the many federal and
state legal issues that came across his desk, it is this statute that he found most problematic and in
need of urgent attention. This article is the author’s modest attempt to provide assistance to those
contending with the statute and to those interested in improving the statute as it is currently
written, and to enrich the Arizona legal community’s broader debate regarding when and under
what circumstances its public bodies and employees may be reached for purposes of liability.
25
See, e.g., Estrada v. City of San Luis, No. CV-07-1071, 2007 WL 4025215, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov.
15, 2007) (rejecting arguments that the state legislature exceeded its constitutional authority in
enacting the notice of claim statute and that the statute is unconstitutionally ambiguous).
26
Stulce v. SRP Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 3 P.3d 1007, 1013 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); see
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (providing that the state legislature shall “direct by law in what manner
and in what courts suits may be brought against the state.”).
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claims against the State, is inherently unfair because it is not imposed
on prospective litigants with claims against non-state parties.27
I. OVERVIEW
This Part provides background information on the development of the
notice of claim statute in the state courts and legislature, and
enumerates the purposes of the statute. This is not intended to serve
as an exhaustive historical account of every judicial or legislative event
related to the statute, but instead to give the reader a sense of how the
statute has progressed over time. Additionally, this Part will examine
the interplay between the state courts and the state legislature when
the statute’s propriety and contents have been at issue.
A. THE ARIZONA JUDICIARY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The “ancient” doctrine of sovereign immunity, which can be
traced back to England, was based in the thought that the King could
do no wrong and therefore was above legal challenges.28 Sovereign
immunity was later embraced in Arizona. In 1902, for example, the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona held that “neither a county
nor its officers,” in the performance of their governmental functions,
can be “made to respond for wrongs . . . unless [a] statute so
declares.”29 In 1920, following the entry of Arizona into formal
statehood, the Arizona Supreme Court maintained the concept of
sovereign immunity. The court wrote that “the state, in consequence of
its sovereignty, is immune from prosecution in the courts and from
liability to respond in damages for negligence, except in those cases
where it has expressly waived immunity or assumed liability by
constitutional or legislative enactment.”30 The court noted that the
27

Cf. Becke, supra note 16, at 260 (criticizing an element of the notice of claim statute because it
requires “significantly greater amount of [factual] detail than would be required in filing a lawsuit
against a private party.”); id. at 263 (“The overall effect of the[] [statute’s] requirements is to
make the State less susceptible to lawsuit, based not on any areas of immunity, but rather on the
shortened period of time in which claimants must act.”).
28
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 142 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
29
Haupt v. Maricopa County, 68 P. 525, 526 (Ariz. 1902).
30
State v. Sharp, 189 P. 631, 631 (Ariz. 1920).
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State was immune from suit, irrespective of the troubling facts or
circumstances of a plaintiff’s case.31
In subsequent decisions, the court upheld this understanding of
sovereign immunity -- the State could not be sued unless a statute had
directed otherwise. In a seminal 1921 case, the Arizona Supreme
Court noted, consistent with its previous pronouncements, that
“[t]here is no statute whereby this state has assumed a liability for the
negligence or misfeasance of its officers or agents, and we find no
established principle of law sustaining such liability in the absence of
such statutory assumption.”32
The court’s loyalty to this rule, however, began showing signs of
cracking. In the same 1921 case, the court declared that it was not the
role of the courts to change this established legal principle. This
statement impliedly suggested that the court was not pleased with the
doctrine, but remained duty-bound to apply it. The court remarked
that, “[n]o consideration of hardships to be avoided would justify a
court in abrogating established principles of substantive law to create
a liability not so assumed. To change substantive law,” the court
added, “is the province of the Legislature, not of the courts.” 33 Three
years later, the court similarly said, “[w]hile we are very much
impressed with the very splendid argument of counsel for plaintiff in
behalf of the rule that would make not only the county but its officers
liable for negligence . . . , this argument is one for the consideration of
the legislative department and not the courts.”34
In 1963, the practical effect of sovereign immunity on litigants
was too much for the Arizona Supreme Court to bear any longer. The
court wrote:
We are of the opinion that when the reason for a certain
rule no longer exists, the rule itself should be abandoned.
After a thorough re-examination of the rule of
governmental immunity from tort liability, we now hold

31

Id. at 633 (“The facts of the case arouse a feeling of great sympathy upon our part for the
plaintiff, but sympathy cannot be suffered to take the place of judicial decision. It is our duty to
declare the law as we find it, not to make it, even in accord with our own desires or wishes.”).
32
State v. Dart, 202 P. 237, 240 (Ariz. 1921) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
33
Id. (internal quotes and citation omitted).
34
Larsen v. Yuma County, 225 P. 1115, 1116 (Ariz. 1924).
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that it must be discarded as a rule of law in Arizona and
all prior decisions to the contrary are hereby overruled.35
In explaining its decision, the court observed that another traditional
doctrine, liability for simple negligence, trumped the notion that any
subset of tortfeasors is immune from liability. “There is perhaps no
doctrine more firmly established than the principle that liability
follows tortious wrongdoing; that where negligence is the proximate
cause of injury, the rule is liability and immunity is the exception.”36
While previous court rulings on the subject expressed discomfort with
sovereign immunity, but stopped short of abrogating the doctrine, the
1963 court felt it was able to overrule sovereign immunity because the
doctrine itself was judicially fathered and adopted. “[W]e realize that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity was originally judicially
created. . . . This doctrine having been engrafted upon Arizona law by
judicial enunciation may properly be changed or abrogated by the same
process.”37
This ruling opened the door for the State to be sued in the
absence of a statute or express waiver. In 1969, however, the court
limited the scope of public liability for negligence, ruling that a
claimant may recover against a public entity or individual only when
the public entity or individual owes a specific duty to the claimant.38
The court concluded, under the facts of the particular case, that
liability did not attach because “[t]he duty of the defendants here is
patently one owed to the general public, not to the individual plaintiffs,
and no facts are pleaded which would bring this case into the realm of
the exceptions to the rule.”39
In 1982, the court did away with the requirement that the
sovereign was liable only when a specific duty was owed to the
claimant. “We shall no longer engage in the speculative exercise of
determining whether the tort-feasor has a general duty to the injured
party, which spells no recovery, or if he had a specific individual duty
35

Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, 381 P.2d 107, 109, 112 (Ariz. 1963) (“The substantive
defense of governmental immunity is now abolished not only for the instant case, but for all other
pending cases, those not yet filed which are not barred by the statute of limitations and all future
causes of action. All previous decisions to the contrary are specifically overruled.”).
36
381 P.2d at 112.
37
Id. at 113.
38
See Massengill v. Yuma County, 456 P.2d 376, 379-81 (Ariz. 1969).
39
Id. at 381.
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which means recovery.”40 The court acknowledged that “by removing
the public/private duty doctrine, [it has] not solved all of the problems
in this area.”41 As with earlier rulings in the context of qualified
immunity, the court called on the legislature to provide clarity in this
area. “We do not recoil from the thought that the legislature may in its
wisdom wish to intervene in some aspects of this development.”42
The legislature, as noted below, responded in kind and since has
played a significant role in setting forth the contours of state liability.
B. THE ARIZONA LEGISLATURE AND NOTICE OF CLAIM
STATUTES
The Arizona Constitution enables the legislature to determine
the circumstances under and fora in which the State may be sued. It
provides, “[t]he Legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in
what courts suits may be brought against the State.”43
The
legislature’s attempts to fulfill this constitutional responsibility went
through several fluctuations.
For example, in 1956, the legislature decided that, “[p]ersons
having claims on contract or for negligence against the state, which
have been disallowed, may . . . bring action thereon against the state
and prosecute the action to final judgment”44 within two years of the
accrual of the cause of action.45 After the Arizona Supreme Court
invited the legislature to intervene in this area in 1982, the legislature
passed the Actions Against Public Entities or Public Employees Act.
Enacted in 1984, this statute declared that the State’s public policy
was that “public entities are liable for acts and omissions of employees
in accordance with the statutes and common law of this state.”46 In
contrast to the previously enacted two-year limitations period, the
1984 Act provided that, “[p]ersons who have claims against a public
entity or public employee” are to “file such claims . . . within twelve
months after the cause of action accrues.”47
40

Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (Ariz. 1982).
Id.
42
Id.
43
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 18.
44
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821 (1956).
45
§ 12-822 (1956).
46
§ 12-820 (1984).
47
§ 12-821(A) (1984).
41

10

While this statutory iteration constricted the time for filing such
suits, it extended a helping hand to claimants: claims would not be
barred where a showing of “excusable neglect” was made,48 where
“excusable neglect” was defined to mean “reasonable and foreseeable
neglect or inadvertence.”49 In addition, claimants alleging medical
malpractice were completely free from having to comply with the
statute’s requirements.50
In 1993, the legislature replaced the 1984 statute with a far
more rigid one. Specifically, it did away with the “excusable neglect”
exception. It also limited the type of claims that may be filed against
the State in personal injury actions: “[a]ll personal injury actions
against any public entity or public employee involving acts that are
alleged to have occurred within the scope of the public employee's
employment shall be brought within one year after the cause of action
accrues and not afterward.”51
One year later, however, the latter limitation was lifted. In
particular, the statute was amended to expand the universe of
permissible claims against the State to “all actions.” “All actions
against any public entity or public employee shall be brought within
one year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.”52
The legislative enactments currently applicable were passed in
2003. The present notice of claim statute requires “[p]ersons who have
claims against a public entity or a public employee [to] file claims with
the person or persons authorized to accept service for the public entity
or public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil
procedure.”53 With respect to timing, a notice of claim generally must
be filed “within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action
accrues.”54 With respect to the consequences of failing to file within
this timeframe, “[a]ny claim which is not filed within one hundred
eighty days after the cause of action accrues is barred and no action
may be maintained thereon.”55 With respect to the contents of the
notice of claim, it must contain two things: first, “facts sufficient to
permit the public entity or public employee to understand the basis
48

Id.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821(E) (1984).
50
Id. § 12-821(D).
51
1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 250, 254 (amended 1994).
52
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821 (1994).
53
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821.01(A) (2003).
54
Id.
55
Id.
49
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upon which liability is claimed,” and second, “a specific amount for
which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.”56
C. PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE
The reason why liability extends to the State was made clear by
the Arizona Supreme Court in 1963: tortfeasors are to answer for their
wrongdoing and the State, just like any other actor is amenable to suit
for his or her tortious acts.57 The question is why the legislature found
it necessary to require claimants to take the additional step of filing
notice of claim with the State prior to the commencement of legal
action. On this point, the courts have identified several justifications
for the notice of claim statute. These purposes are important to
consider not only in examining how to comply with the statute, but
also in fashioning possible alternatives to the statute, given the
problems plaintiffs have had in achieving compliance.
The first, and likely most obvious, reason for the statute is to
place the State on notice of prospective legal claims.58 Second, and less
manifest, the notice of claim statute aims to guard against the
possibility that claimants will present the State with baseless
demands. An Arizona appellate court remarked that the “[t]he
legislature enacted the claim statute as part of a movement to subject
government to reasonable liability”59 and to “protect[] the government
from excess or unwarranted liability[.]”60 Similarly, an en banc panel
of the Arizona Supreme Court observed that the statute “ensures that
claimants will not demand unfounded amounts that constitute quick
unrealistic exaggerated demands.”61
Third, with knowledge of the claims and a diminished likelihood
that unreasonable claims will be filed, the State possesses a
meaningful opportunity to investigate the allegations and assess its
possible liability.62 Fourth, with an evaluation of the allegations and
56

Id.
See Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, 381 P.2d 107, 112 (Ariz. 1963).
58
See Backus, 204 P.3d at 403 (“the purpose of the notice of claim statute is to . . . put the
governmental entity on notice of a claim . . . ”).
59
Yollin v. City of Glendale, 191 P.3d 1040, 1044-45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
60
Id. at 1045.
61
Deer Valley, 152 P.3d at 493 (internal quote and citation omitted).
62
See Yollin, 191 P.3d at 1045 (the statute “allow[s] the government to investigate the claim[.]”);
id. at 1048 (“The claim statute anticipates that government entities will investigate claims . . . ”);
Deer Valley, 152 P.3d at 493 (the statute fosters the ability of the State “to evaluate the amount
57
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potential liability, the State is in position to determine whether or not
it will settle with the claimant.63 Settlement is preferable over
contentious and costly litigation, and therefore is in the interests of the
State. The Arizona Supreme Court noted over fifty years ago that, “[i]t
has always been the policy of the law to favor compromise and
settlement; and it is especially important to sustain that principle in
this age of voluminous litigation . . . .”64 This principle was reiterated
recently by a lower Arizona court when it said, “sound legal policy
ought to favor compromise and settlement over litigation.”65
Finally, in the event of a settlement or judgment at trial, the
notice of claim statute permits the State to prepare for the financial
burden of a settlement or damages award. Put another way, the
statute enables the government to “budget for settlement or payment
of large claims”66 and “to make settlement and budgeting decisions
with a reasonable estimate of its maximum exposure.”67
While the statutory language appears to be relatively
straightforward and the purposes of the statute eminently
understandable, a separate issue is whether the courts have been able
to reliably and consistently apply the statute to different factual
circumstances. The following section indicates that the judicial results
have been less than satisfactory.
II. THE COURTS’ TREATMENT OF THE
NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUTE
A review of the courts’ application of the notice of claim statute
to recent cases reveals where the courts are in lockstep and also where
they diverge in interpreting the statute.
First, the areas of
congruence: both state and federal courts require “strict” compliance
with each of the statute’s requirements. In addition, these courts are
claimed.”).
63
See 191 P.3d at 1045 (“[The statute] also provides government a meaningful opportunity to
make a settlement decision prior to the initiation of a court proceeding.”); see also Falcon v.
Maricopa County, 144 P.3d 1254, 1256 (Ariz. 2006); Martineau v. Maricopa County, 86 P.3d 912,
915-16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
64
Dansby v. Buck, 373 P.2d 1, 8 (Ariz. 1962).
65
Myers v. Wood, 850 P.2d 672, 673 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
66
Yollin, 191 P.3d at 1045.
67
Id. at n.3; see also Martineau, 86 P.3d at 915-16 (the statute “assist[s] the public entity in
financial planning and budgeting.”).
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also in agreement regarding the meaning of the first substantive
requirement of the statute – the need for a sufficient factual basis
supporting the alleged liability. Perhaps more important than these
commonalities is the disparate understanding of the statute.
Specifically, the state courts have mistakenly and leniently interpreted
the second substantive requirement – that the notice of claim contain a
specific settlement sum along with a factual basis for that amount. At
the same time, the federal courts have rightfully issued more “strict”
opinions regarding this requirement. The state and federal courts
have demonstrated therefore an inconsistency in applying the statute.
A. STRICT COMPLIANCE
Under the notice of claim statute, claims not filed within one
hundred eighty days after the date of accrual are “barred and no action
may be maintained thereon.”68 Accordingly, the Arizona courts have
noted that the statute operates as a procedural barrier to relief–a
claimant’s failure to adhere to the statute means that his claims are
precluded from moving forward.69 For example, an Arizona court
stated that compliance with the statute is a “mandatory and essential
prerequisite to [a] cause of action . . . .”70
By its terms, the statute’s text addresses its preclusive effect in
reference to the window within which the notice of claim must be
filed.71 The Arizona courts have stated, however, that a claimant
“must strictly comply” with the statute without confining the strict
compliance standard to any particular requirement, indicating that a
claimant must carefully adhere to each of the requirements.72
As a result, the courts have held that “substantial compliance
do[es] not excuse failure to comply with the statutory requirements of
A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A),”73 again linking the strict compliance standard
not to any single element of the statute, but rather to the statute as a
68

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821.01(A) (2003).
See e.g., Crum v. Superior Court, 922 P.2d 316, 318 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Salerno v. Espinoza,
115 P.3d 626, 628 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
70
Martineau, 86 P.3d at 914 (internal quotes omitted).
71
See Backus, 204 P.3d at 402 (“[s]trict compliance relative to the specific settlement amount
demanded is required.”) (citation omitted).
72
Jones v. Cochise County, 187 P.3d 97, 102 (Ct. App. Ariz. 2008); see Newson, supra note 22, at
900 (“claimants have very little room for error when filing against public entities . . . Future
claimants would be well advised to read and understand the required elements and not rely on
substantial compliance.”).
73
Falcon, 144 P.3d at 1256.
69
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whole. In 2008, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that this exacting
and uncompromising interpretation of the statute–namely that “strict
compliance” with the statute in its entirety is required–is consistent
with its previous orders.74 An intermediate state court acknowledged
that a literal reading of the statute’s “all-encompassing language” may
have extensive reach, but that the courts were not in a position to call
for something other than a strict interpretation of the statute.75 To be
sure, the courts have cautioned that while a strict reading of the
statute’s requirements is in order, “evaluation of that compliance
should not turn on a reading of . . . the notice of claim . . . that risks
elevating form over substance.”76
The federal courts are in line with the state courts in that the
federal bench concurs that a failure to abide by the notice of claim
statute bars the underlying claims from proceeding. In fact, the
federal district courts have borrowed language from an Arizona court
ruling–that compliance with the statute is a “mandatory and essential
prerequisite to [a] cause of action”77–in setting forth the general notice
of claim standard of review.
In addition, the federal courts appear to be consistent with the
state court holdings that compliance with the statute as a whole must
be interpreted strictly. For example, in a 2008 case, a federal district
court judge said that, “compliance with the statutory requirements of
the Notice of Claim statute is strictly construed.”78 The same year, a
separate federal judge observed that, “[t]he state legislature has
amended the statute to affirm that the statute's requirements are to be
strictly applied.”79 Unsurprisingly, and also in 2008, a federal district
court judge specifically rejected the argument, put forth by the
plaintiff, that the notice of claim statute is to be “liberally construed.” 80
74

Lee v. State, 182 P.3d 1169, 1177 (Ariz. 2008) (discussing Falcon, 144 P.3d 1254; Deer Valley,
152 P.3d 490).
75
Fields, 193 P.3d at 788.
76
Jones, 187 P.3d at 102.
77
See e.g., Perkins, 2008 WL 4418145, at *8 (quoting Martineau, 86 P.3d at 914); Villescaz v.
City of Eloy, No. 06-2686, 2008 WL 4277943, at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2008) (quoting same);
Nored v. City of Tempe, No. 08-00008, 2008 WL 2561905, at *3 n.3 (D. Ariz. June 26, 2008)
(quoting Salerno, 115 P.3d at 628).
78
Pitroff, 2008 WL 3890496, at *1 (quoting Deer Valley, 152 P.3d 490); see Castaneda v. City of
Williams, No. 07-00129, 2007 WL 1713328, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 12, 2007) (“the notice of claim
statute must be strictly construed.”) (quoting Deer Valley, 152 P.3d at 496).
79
Nored, 2008 WL 2561905, at *4.
80
Baker v. City of Tempe, No. 07-1553, 2008 WL 2277882 , at *4 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2008).
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The federal courts also maintain that “substantial or reasonable
compliance” with the statutory requirements is insufficient.”81
The notion that compliance with the notice of claim statute is to
be strictly construed provides a necessary and useful backdrop for an
examination of whether and to what extent the courts have, in
practice, strictly ensured compliance with the two substantive
requirements of the statute–1) providing “facts sufficient to permit the
public entity or public employee to understand the basis upon which
liability is claimed,” and 2) “a specific amount for which the claim can
be settled and the facts supporting that amount.”82 The remaining
sections of this Part will indicate that the courts have strictly
construed compliance with the former requirement, but have not
uniformly done so with respect to the latter requirement.
B. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS:
FACTUAL BASIS FOR ALLEGED LIABILITY
The first substantive element of the notice of claim statute
requires a claimant to provide “facts sufficient to permit the public
entity or public employee to understand the basis upon which liability
is claimed . . . .”83 This requirement appears to be the most clear, and
is therefore seldom litigated.
This prong of the statute calls upon claimants to simply “set
forth facts concerning the event or events allegedly giving rise to
liability sufficient to allow the government to identify and investigate
the occurrence . . . .”84 Put differently, the notice “must contain enough
information to allow the entity to investigate the merits of the claim
and assess its potential for liability.”85
As a result, a notice of claim that lists only the claims without
providing any facts in support of the claims is inadequate,86 because it
deprives the public defendants of the opportunity to examine the
81

Dillon v. Arizona, No. 08-0796, 2008 WL 4628475, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2008) (citation
omitted).
82
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN . § 12-821.01(A) (2003).
83
Id.
84
Backus, 204 P.3d at 402.
85
Barth v. Cochise County, 138 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Ct. App. Ariz. 2006) (citation omitted); see
Baker v. City of Tempe, No. 07-1553, 2008 WL 2277882, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 30, 2008) (“The
claim must contain facts that will sufficiently enable the public entity or public employee to
appreciate the basis of liability upon which the claim is founded.”) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-821.01(A)).
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alleged wrongdoing. Similarly, a federal court, noting that “[t]he
purpose of this statutory requirement is to allow the public entity to
investigate and assess the claim,” dismissed a notice of claim because
the facts did not enable the public defendant to “investigate and assess
the claim.”87
Contentiousness with respect to this requirement typically
arises in the context of whether a claimant should have amended or
supplemented his notice of claim. A “public entity necessarily cannot
understand from a notice of claim the basis of any liability that might
be based on facts that are unstated in the notice.”88 Accordingly, any
facts which form the basis for alleged liability that occur after the
notice of claim was filed necessarily cannot be investigated or
examined by the public entity or employee because there is no formal
notice of them. A claimant must, in that situation, amend or
supplement the original notice of claim to encompass those later facts.
Given the relative plain understanding of this requirement,
issues with compliance generally occur with respect to the second
substantive prong of the statutory requirements for a notice of claim–
whether the notice includes a specific settlement sum along with a
factual basis for that amount. This more complicated element is the
subject of the next section.

86

See Smith v. Johnston, Nos. 2007-0145, 2007-0061, 2008 WL 4292735, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Sept. 19, 2008).
87
Adams, 2008 WL 3843585, at *4.
88
Haab v. County of Maricopa, 191 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
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C. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS:
SPECIFIC SETTLEMENT AMOUNT AND RELEVANT FACTS
a. Specific Settlement Amount
The notice of claim statute requires claimants to include “a
specific amount for which the claim can be settled and the facts
supporting that amount.”89
Generally, the “specific amount” is
understood to serve as a settlement offer, with the term “offer” to be
construed as it is in hornbook contract law.
For example, an Arizona appellate court, in discussing the
sufficiency of a dollar figure noted in a notice of claim, recited the
established contract principle that an offer–in this context, the
“specific amount” in a notice of claim–should “manifest[] [a]
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another
person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and
will conclude it.”90 As put by another appellate court ruling, “to satisfy
the ‘sum certain’ requirement, the claimant must be willing to let the
government finally settle the claim by paying the amount demanded in
the notice of claim.”91 Again:
The claimant must present the government with a
definite amount which he is willing to accept as full
satisfaction of his claim. As long as the claimant states a
definite and exact amount, and the government may
completely satisfy its liability by paying that sum, the
claim letter satisfies the sum certain requirement.92
As a result, a “specific amount” may not contain any qualifying
or modifying language. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court
determined that the use of terms such as “approximately,” “or more
going forward,” and “no less than,” in connection with a settlement
amount is not a “specific amount” because these terms make “it
impossible to ascertain the precise amount for which the [public entity
or employee] could have settled [the] claim.”93
89

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821.01(A) (2003).
Jones, 187 P.3d at 101 (citations omitted).
91
Yollin, 191 P.3d at 1044 (citation omitted).
92
Id. at 1045.
93
Deer Valley, 152 P.3d at 492-93 (emphasis added).
90
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As with the state court decisions regarding a specific sum,
federal courts hold that claimants must present a clear and
unambiguous settlement figure. For example, one federal district
court judge found that a notice of claim containing a settlement
amount of “not less than $250,000.00” was “insufficiently specific to
satisfy the Notice of Claim statute.”94 Similarly, the federal district
court also held that a notice of claim, which noted that the claims could
be “brought” for a certain amount, was inadequate because the amount
that may be sought at trial “cannot be construed to constitute a specific
settlement amount . . . .”95
b. Relevant Facts
The state courts have, up until this point of analysis,
consistently applied a “strict” interpretation of the notice of claim
statute’s requirements against filed notices of claim.
Recently,
however, state courts have began to adopt a more relaxed view of what
is sufficient for purposes of the requirement to include facts supporting
a settlement amount. This more permissive interpretation not only
violates the ostensibly established rule that the statute’s requirements
are to be “strictly” interpreted, but created a split between state and
federal court decisions, the latter of which have more faithfully
continued the “strict” application theme regarding each of the statute’s
elements.
The problems appear to have commenced after the Arizona
Supreme Court released a rare en banc notice of claim ruling. In Deer
Valley v. Houser, the court stated in an important footnote that the
claimant did not provide “any facts supporting the claimed
amounts . . . .”96 In the same footnote, however, the court specifically
noted that “[b]ecause the claimant’s letter does not include a specific
sum, we need not reach the [public entity’s] argument that [claimant’s]
letter also fails to provide facts supporting the amount claimed.”97
The Deer Valley Court specifically stated that it was not making
a legal conclusion on the “facts supporting” the settlement amount
requirement, noting that the notice of claim did not contain any such
facts. Subsequent lower Arizona courts have relied on the footnote to
94

Pitroff, 2008 WL 3890496, at *2 (citation omitted).
Campos v. City of Glendale, No. 06-0610, 2007 WL 3287586, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 05, 2007).
96
Deer Valley, 152 P.3d at 494 n.3 (emphasis in original).
97
Id. (emphasis added).
95
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fashion an exceedingly relaxed standard for what is sufficient for the
“facts supporting” requirement. In 2008, for example, an intermediate
Arizona court stated in a wrongful death action that “[i]f the notices of
claim . . . contain any facts to support the proposed settlement
amounts, regardless of how meager, then such notices met not only the
literal language of the statute but also any requirement that may be
implied from Deer Valley.”98 Again, “any facts in support of the claimed
amount constitute the minimal compliance necessary to satisfy the
statute as written.”99 In a separate action, a court cited Deer Valley for
the proposition that “the supporting facts requirement is intended to
be a relatively light burden on claimants . . . .”100 In addition, a state
court remarked, “[i]f the State in good faith truly wanted further
information about the [facts supporting the claim], it certainly could
have asked for it . . . .”101
These courts’ soft view of the “factual support” requirement
seems to be incorrect. To be sure, for a claimant to factually support
an amount in a wrongful death action is a grim and unfortunate
endeavor. As the appeals court noted, it is “unreasonable . . . to expect
surviving family members to provide some level of factual detail to
justify and value their intangible grief over the loss of a loved one.” 102
A goal of the notice of claim statute, however, is to ensure that a
claimant does not present the State with exaggerated and
unreasonably high demands for monetary damages.103 This goal exists
regardless of the nature of the claim and in circumstances in which the
calculation of damages would be difficult or unpleasant, such as the
loss of a limb, loss of consortium, or lost wages, or where the theories
for relief are relatively difficult to quantify, such as pain and suffering
or emotional distress. Thus, necessary facts to support the settlement
demand should be provided irrespective of the nature of the claim, but
those facts undoubtedly can be examined in consideration of the
specific context at hand, such as if the claims concern a loss of a loved
one.104
98

Backus, 204 P.3d at 406 (first emphasis in original; second added).
Id. at *8 (first emphasis in original; second added).
100
Yollin, 191 P.3d at 1048 (emphasis added).
101
Backus, 204 P.3d at 406.
102
Id. at *8.
103
See Deer Valley, 152 P.3d at 493 (internal quote and citation omitted).
104
See Jones, 187 P.2d at 103 (“The factual-basis requirement of § 12-821.01 must be viewed in
light of the inherent uncertainty in damages for pain and suffering and future lost wages. And it
must be viewed in the context of the relatively compressed time period-180 days-within which the
99
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Moreover, the notion that a claimant’s notice is sufficient
because the State subsequently may ask for further factual
information stands in stark contrast to other statutory requirements.
The statute’s requirements do not contemplate a flexible back-andforth exchange; instead, it obligates the claimant to fully fulfill the
mandates of the statute regardless of the knowledge present on the
public’s side. For example, with respect to filing, the State having
actual notice of a claim does not relieve the claimant of his
independent responsibility to fulfill the statutory mandate to provide
the State with notice of the claim.105
Further, the notion that a “meager” factual foundation106 or that
“minimal compliance”107 is sufficient for a statutory requirement, or
that the requirement itself is “relatively light,”108 is inconsistent with
the instruction from the Arizona courts, which consistently held that
each of the requirements is to be “strictly” construed. The lax
treatment of the “supporting facts” requirement is, quite clearly, an
anomaly.109
By contrast, the federal courts’ response to the uncertainty
following the Arizona’s Supreme Court ruling in Deer Valley generally
has been one of adherence to the principle that the statute’s
requirements are to be strictly construed.110 Indeed, in the case of
notice of claim must be filed, and the factual information supporting it marshaled, after the cause
of action accrues.”).
105
See Falcon, 144 P.3d at 1256.
106
Backus, 204 P.3d at 406.
107
Id. at *8.
108
Yollin, 191 P.3d at 1048.
109
Before printing, the Arizona Supreme Court issued an opinion that also falls short. In Backus v.
State, the Court stated that, “[A] claimant complies with the supporting-facts requirement of § 12821.01.A by providing the factual foundation that the claimant regards as adequate to permit the
public entity to evaluate the specific amount claimed…. [A] public entity can request more facts if
needed to evaluate a claim.” 203 P.3d 499, 504-05 (Ariz. 2009) (emphasis added). While this
decision correctly suggests that the onus is on the claimant to furnish a factual foundation, it seems
to leave to the discretion of the claimant what counts as “adequate,” which in turn begs the
question what is the courts’ independent role in determining that the statute is “sufficient” to
enable the public defendant(s) to examine the prospective claims. It further repeats the mistake of
indicating that a defendant requesting more information is a cure for the claimant’s own
responsibility to satisfy the statute. In this respect, the federal courts are correctly focusing on
whether the notice allows for the defendant to properly evaluate the claims.
110
To be sure, not all federal courts have adopted a uniform approach to this element of the
statute. For example, one court, operating in the vacuum created by Deer Valley, noted that
“sparse” information provided by the claimant “satisfies the literal requirements of the statute[.]”
Castaneda, 2007 WL 1713328 at *4. This ruling is problematic for the same reasons identified
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Jasper Simmons which opened our discussion of the statute, a federal
district court stated flatly that the supporting facts requirement “is not
mere window dressing,” instead it is a “mandate that ensures that
government entities will be able to realistically consider a claim”111 and
that “ensures that claimants will not demand unfounded amounts that
constitute quick unrealistic exaggerated demands.”112 Accordingly, as
was noted in another federal case, “[i]n order to satisfy this
requirement, the description of facts supporting the settlement amount
must be such that a public entity can discern the relationship between
the facts and the settlement amount.”113 In other words, the notice of
claim must explain how the claimant reached the settlement demand,
“as opposed to any other conceivable settlement value.”114
In the Simmons case, the standard played out this way: the
factual foundation for the settlement amount was found to be
inadequate because the public defendants “could not properly evaluate
Plaintiffs’ claim.”115 Similarly, in a separate action, the factual
foundation was held to be insufficient because “Plaintiff’s notice
provides no insight as to how Plaintiff arrived at the $750,000
[settlement] figure.”116
These federal decisions seem to have it right. They suggest that
there must be a discernable relationship between the settlement
amount and the facts which allow the public defendants to understand
why the settlement amount was chosen, and to ensure that the amount
itself is grounded in the facts and is not an exaggerated, unfounded
demand.
The federal courts’ emphasis on a link between the
settlement figure and the facts appears to fulfill the statutory purposes
of the overall statute, specifically allowing the public entities or
individuals to properly evaluate the settlement option and to safeguard
against unreasonable settlement amounts.
To illustrate the difference between the state and federal courts’
examination of the supporting facts requirement, consider this
conclusion from a recent Arizona appellate court ruling:

with respect to the forgiving state court decisions.
111
Simmons, 2008 WL 343292, at *4 (alterations removed; internal quotes and citation omitted).
112
Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
113
Campos, 2007 WL 3287586, at *2.
114
Bamonte v. City of Mesa, No. 06-1860, 2007 WL 2022011, at *6 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2007)
115
Simmons, 2008 WL 343292, at *4 (citations omitted).
116
Campos, 2007 WL 3287586, at *3.
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[The public defendant] argues that A.R.S. § 12-821.01
requires a claimant to set forth facts “sufficient to
support” its settlement demand. We cannot construe the
statute in such fashion. The legislature specifically
provided that a claim notice must contain “facts sufficient
to permit the public entity or public employee to
understand the basis upon which liability is claimed.”
A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). We infer that, by contrast, because
the legislature omitted a requirement that the “facts
supporting” the settlement demand must be “sufficient,” it
did not intend that a notice would fail without “facts
sufficient to support” the settlement demand.117
While the state court’s literal construction of the statute appears
to be well-reasoned, it has committed the error of divorcing the
statutory command regarding the “facts supporting” requirement from
the statutory purposes of the statute. As the federal courts have noted,
the facts in support of the settlement amount must be such that the
State can understand how the settlement amount was determined and
to ensure that unreasonable claims for liability are not pressed.
Though the legislature may not have included the word “sufficient”
with respect to the “facts supporting” element, the elements
themselves must be viewed in light of the overall purposes of the
statute; otherwise, the courts run the risk of elevating form over
substance and thereby contravening the objectives of the statute itself.
The federal courts, instead, appropriately ensure that the claims are
tied to the purposes and are not just empty demands placed on
claimants. More specifically, even without the term’s explicit presence
in the statute, the federal courts have looked into whether the
supporting facts are sufficient to allow the public defendants to
understand the link between the facts and the settlement amount.
To summarize, first, in state and federal courts, each of the
statute’s requirements is to be strictly complied with and claims that
do not comply are to be barred. Second, in both state and federal
courts, a claimant is to provide facts sufficient to permit public
defendants with the opportunity to investigate the claims and
understand the factual basis for alleged liability. Third, the sum
117

Havasupai Tribe of Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1063, 1074
(Ariz. App. 2008).
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certain to be provided in a notice of claim is to be construed as a
settlement offer.
For state courts, the attendant factual foundation requirement
means that any facts that the claimant believes supports the
settlement amount are sufficient. The federal courts, by contrast, look
to whether a nexus between the offer and facts has been established.
In other words, state courts appear to ask whether there are some
facts that support the settlement figure in the claimant’s view, while
federal courts inquire as to whether the facts put public defendants in
a position to understand the basis for the settlement amount–a more
demanding standard. Accordingly, it would be fair to observe that the
federal courts’ holdings generally are more faithful to the “strict”
construction of the notice of claim requirements. The federal courts, to
their credit, also did not adopt the “you can ask more if you want to”
doctrine that the state courts curiously created for purposes of this
requirement.
Despite the apparent divergence regarding the treatment of the
notice of claim requirements by state and federal courts, it is possible
to extract from these rulings some suggestions on how to comply with
the statute. In other words, while the courts overall do not seem to be
in lockstep with respect to the standards applicable to the statute’s
requirements, the absence of such coherence renders compliance more
problematic, but not impossible.118 The following section offers some
guidance on how claimants can comply with the procedural and
substantive aspects of the statute.
III. GUIDANCE ON COMPLYING WITH
THE NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUTE
Based on the discussion of the courts’ treatment of cases
implicating the notice of claim statute, it is possible to glean several
recommendations for practitioners to comply with the statute. Such
guidance takes into account the fact that the courts themselves have
fluctuated in terms of how the statute’s requirements are to be
interpreted and applied to specific claims, and should be helpful
irrespective of whether a claimant is appearing in a federal or state
forum. To facilitate the use of this guidance and its comprehension by
118

See, e.g., Fields, 193 P.3d at 789 (referring to compliance with the statute as an
“insurmountable” hurdle).
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attorneys and pro se litigants alike, these points are presented in
bullet form. Please note that this guidance is non-exhaustive, but
should be useful in ensuring compliance with the statute’s
requirements.
A. THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTE






It is important to recognize when one has to worry about or
contend with the notice of claim statute. While the statutory
language makes plain that notice is to be provided when a public
entity or individual is to be sued,119 the statute applies only to
claims for damages–conversely, it does not come into play for
purposes of claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.120 That
the statute does not apply to claims for equitable relief is
supported by the fact that the statute is designed to inform the
government of possible money damages and allow it to budget
for such damages.121
Though a claimant seeking a declaratory judgment or injunction
does not have to concern himself with the notice of claim statute,
claimants seeking money damages as part of a class action suit
do–a court clearly noted that “the notice of claim
requirements . . . apply to all claims against public entities,
including class action claims.”122
This may seem obvious to most, but the statute requires
claimants to file a notice of claim prior to initiating suit against
a public entity or a public employee. In one case, a plaintiff
unsuccessfully argued that the statute applied only when a
public entity was the subject of the suit. The court noted quite
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See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821.01(A) (2003) (“[p]ersons who have claims against a public
entity or a public employee [to] file claims with the person or persons authorized to accept service
for the public entity or public employee.”).
120
Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. Kard, 199 P.3d 629, 636 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 08, 2008)
(“The notice of claim statute applies to a request for damages, rather than to a request for
declaratory or injunctive relief.”) (citations omitted); see Deer Valley, 152 P.3d 490, 491 (“Before
initiating an action for damages against a public entity, a claimant must provide a notice of claim
to the entity”) (emphasis added).
121
See Martineau, 86 P.3d at 915-16.
see supra Part I (D) for more information on the purposes of the statute.
122
Fields, 193 P.3d at 785; see State v. Mabery Ranch, Co., L.L.C., 165 P.3d 211, 245 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2007) (“Because such claims for injunctive relief by definition seek no money damages, it
would be nonsensical for the statute to command such a claimant to state a ‘specific amount for
which the claim can be settled.’” (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821.01(A) (2003)).
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simply that the statute applies to “[p]ersons who have claims
against a public entity or a public employee.”123
A public employee is defined broadly by the statute to mean “an
officer, director, employee or servant, whether or not
compensated or part time, who is authorized to perform any act
or service.”124
The statute applies to a claim against a public employee
regardless of whether the employee in question is sued in his
individual or official capacity.125 The relevant inquiry for
purposes of the statute is not whether the employee is sued on
an individual or official basis, but whether the underlying cause
of action arises out of the scope of the employee’s employment.126
The scope of employment is construed expansively–it constitutes
any conduct that “is the kind the employee is employed to
perform, it occurs within the authorized time and space limits,
and furthers the employer’s business even if the employer has
expressly forbidden it.”127 Indeed, a public employee’s actions,
“even those serving personal desires, will be deemed motivated
to serve the employer if those actions are incidental to the
employee’s legitimate work activity.”128 Thus, even sexual
harassment that takes place while a public employee is
performing authorized duties may be considered within the
scope of employment and consequently trigger the notice of
claim requirements.129
Similarly, with respect to acts of discrimination, a notice of
claim must cover ongoing discriminatory conduct.130 In other
words, allegations of discrimination that post-date a notice of
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Currie v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 07-2093, 2008 WL 2512841, at *1 (D. Ariz.
June 20, 2008) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821.01(A); emphasis in original).
124
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-820(1).
125
See Perkins, 2008 WL 4418145, at *8; Currie, 2008 WL 2512841, at *1.
126
See McCloud v. State, 170 P.3d 691, 699-700 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“The notice of claim
statute has consistently been applied only to claims arising out of acts by public employees in the
scope of their employment. To interpret [the notice of claim statute] to encompass acts outside an
employee's scope of employment would be inconsistent with those decisions.”) (citations omitted).
127
Baker ex rel. Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix, Inc., 5 P.3d 249, 254
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); see Love v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 760 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988) (“The conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if it is of the kind the
employee is employed to perform, it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
limit, and it is actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master.”) (citations omitted).
128
Dube v. Desai, 186 P.3d 587, 590 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
129
See id. at 591 (discussing State v. Schallock, 941 P.2d 1275, 1283 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc)).
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claim are not included in the notice of claim and are barred as a
result.131 By contrast, a passive tortious conduct, such as failing
to repair a sewer line, does not require a subsequent notice of
claim.132 The distinction between affirmative conduct (e.g.,
discrimination) and a continuing commission (e.g., not
performing a repair) may be useful in ascertaining when a
particular notice of claim is sufficient. It appears an amended
notice or multiple notices are required for the former, while a
single notice may be adequate for the latter.133
B. SERVICE OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM


The notice of claim must be filed “within one hundred eighty
days after the cause of action accrues.”134 The statute clarifies
that “a cause of action accrues when the damaged party realizes
he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should
know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition
which caused or contributed to the damage.”135 An exception to
the one hundred eighty day window is carved out for those
claims that “must be submitted to a binding or nonbinding
dispute resolution process or an administrative claims process or
review process pursuant to a statute, ordinance, resolution,
administrative or governmental rule or regulation, or
contractual term[.]”136 These claims do not accrue for purposes
of the statute “until all such procedures, processes or remedies
have been exhausted” and the accrual date begins to “run from
the date on which a final decision or notice of disposition is
issued in an alternative dispute resolution procedure,
administrative claim or review process.”137 Where the dispute

See Konrath v. Amphitheater Unified Sch Dist. No. 10, No. Civ 04-179-TUC-CKJ , 2007 WL
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resolution, administrative claims, or review process is mandated
by contract, however, the parties may “agree[] to extend the time
for filing such notice of claim.”138
The notice of claim statute’s requirements are strictly
interpreted.139 This rule applies particularly with respect to
service. Specifically, “actual notice” of a claim is insufficient to
satisfy the service requirements of the statute.140 In other
words, that a public entity or employee may have information
that it or he will be subject to suit by a claimant does not absolve
the claimant from having to fulfill his own responsibilities
regarding service on the public entity or employee.141
Generally, to properly file a notice of claim, a claimant may
actually deliver or send the notice by way of the regular mail,
however in the latter case proof of mailing should be retained as
it is “evidence that the governmental entity actually received the
notice.”142 More specifically, if the public entity or individual
disputes that notice was sent by mail, a claimant may present
proof of mailing “showing that [the notice] was timely sent,
correctly addressed, and postage paid . . . .”143 A factfinder,
armed with this evidence, may properly “determine if the claim
was in fact received within the statutory deadline.”144
If a claimant sues a public entity and a public employee, the
claimant “must give [prior] notice of the claim to both the
employee individually and to his employer.”145 Put another way,
the statute “requires that service be made on public employees,
in addition to the entities that employ them, as a prerequisite to
any lawsuit against such employees.”146 For example, in a case
where claimants sent notice to a public agency but not to a
public employee also named in the suit, the state claims against
the public employee were dismissed.147 Similarly, in a suit
against the City of Tucson and two individual Tucson Police
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Department officers, notice was owed,, but not presented,, to the
officers.148 The claims against the officers were dismissed
accordingly.
If a claimant sues a public board with multiple members, service
upon a single member may not suffice for purposes of placing
the entire board on notice of the claim. For example, service to a
single board member of a county board of supervisors, where the
board itself was a defendant, did not satisfy the notice of claim’s
filing requirements.149
Where the notice of claim is to be transmitted to individual
public employees, the notice should expressly state that the
individuals will be defendants in a subsequent action. For
example, sending a notice of claim to a police department and
simply addressing it to the attention of an individual officer does
not satisfy the statutory service requirements.150 Claimants
would be prudent to file the claim with each named individual
public defendant–an additional postage stamp or two is worth it,
considering that a failure to comply with this requirement may
lead to dismissal of all state law claims.
C. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS





The notice of claim requires a claimant to “set forth facts
concerning the event or events allegedly giving rise to liability
sufficient to allow the government to identify and investigate
the occurrence . . . .”151 To be sufficient, the notice “must contain
enough information to allow the entity to investigate the merits
of the claim and assess its potential for liability.”152
Generally, if liability is predicated on facts that took place after
the notice was filed, a claimant should amend the original notice
of claim or file a supplemental one. This is because a “public
entity necessarily cannot understand from a notice of claim the
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basis of any liability that might be based on facts that are
unstated in the notice . . . .”153 Please note the discussion of
affirmative acts versus commissions above for further guidance
on when amended or supplementary notices are in order.
The notice should contain a clear unequivocal amount for which
the claimant agrees to settle his claims. The settlement amount
should be considered to be a settlement offer. It should state, for
example, “I will settle all claims against [the public entity or
public employee] for [x dollar amount],” “I hereby agree to
discharge all claims against [the public entity or public
employee] for [x dollar amount],” or “I hereby offer to settle all
claims [the public entity or public employee] for [x dollar
amount].”
The “specific amount” should not contain any qualifying or
modifying language.154
The “specific amount” need only include a single, total sum; it
need not be itemized.155
When filing in state court, a claimant should include in his
notice of claim facts the claimant thinks is adequate to “support”
the settlement amount.156 In the context of wrongful death
actions, the facts needed to pass muster are relatively minimal.
157





When filing in federal court, by contrast, a claimant should
provide “a description of facts . . . such that a public entity can
discern the relationship between the facts and the settlement
amount.”158 This description should explain how the settlement
amount was arrived at.
Due to the possibility of removal of an action filed in state
court,159 it is advisable to comply with the more stringent federal
court treatment of this requirement.

153

Haab, 191 P.3d at 1029.
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To simplify the statute’s substantive requirements and to ensure
proper compliance, it would be useful to develop a standard, boilerplate
form that claimants could use when filing a notice of claim with a
public defendant, much in the same way that individuals alleging
discrimination against their employers generally use the an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission “charge of discrimination” form
to put the employer on notice of the nature and circumstances
surrounding the allegations of discrimination. A possible notice of
claim form could include the following:
Each claimant’s name, address, and phone number.
The name of each public defendant, including entities and
individuals, their addresses and phone numbers. (It would be
prudent to send the notice of claim to each person listed; for the
public entities, a claimant must ensure that the recipient is
empowered to receive service on behalf of the entity.)
 The date on which, or the dates during which, the alleged
liability took place (if ongoing, indicate as such).
 Whether and, if so, on what date(s) the claim went through a
mandatory grievance or other prior proceeding.
 The date on which the notice is being filed (compare this date
and the previous dates to ensure the claim is within the
applicable statutory timeframes).
 The facts giving rise to the alleged disability, using names,
dates, and a description of the relevant events. These facts must
be such that the public defendants can investigate the claim and
understand the factual basis for the alleged disability. There
should be a nexus between the facts and the theories of liability.
 An unequivocal, clear settlement offer, which may be written in
the following terms: “I hereby offer to settle these claims for $
[amount].”
 The facts such that the public defendants can discern the
relationship between the settlement amount and the facts of the
case, and thereby assess their potential liability.
The
description should indicate to the public defendants that the
settlement offer is directly tied to the facts and is not an
arbitrary or inflated number.
While compliance with the notice of claim statute may be
possible, as a descriptive matter the statute has operated to bar a
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number of claims despite its relatively straightforward language and
purposes. If a statute continues to lead to the dismissal of state law
claims, years after its enactment and with a growing number of
relevant court pronouncements, the inevitable conclusions are that the
statute itself has confounded litigants and that existing guidance from
the courts has been insufficient, as a whole, to bring claimants within
the limits of the statute’s mandate.
Accordingly, it is in the interests of the Arizona justice system to
implement a notice of claim statute that satisfies the legislative goals
of the original statute, while giving its citizens a meaningful
opportunity to comply and to press their claims to the merits stage.
This new statute must reflect not only each of the statutory purposes
of the original statute, but also reflect the political situation within
which the notice operates, and the courts’ treatment of the existing
requirements. This new statute must contain clear language that will
render compliance easier and less subject to ambiguity, uncertainty,
and interpretive battles in motions to dismiss.
Crafting a suitable replacement for the statute is the purpose of
Part IV.
IV. REPLACING THE NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUTE
The current notice of claim statute may be sensible as a matter
of public policy and compliance may be achieved, especially with
guidance from the points outlined above.160 It is also the case,
however, that the statute, straightforward as it is, has resulted in the
dismissal of a number of state-law claims. What is worse, the courts
themselves have issued evolving opinions on the notice of claim
requirements. As a result, the claimants are in the difficult position of
trying to comply with the statute in reliance on previous, inconsistent
court orders as indications of what their particular notices of claim
must contain. Put another way, they are faced with a moving target
that the courts have been unable to render stationary.
Though compliance with the statute is possible, the statute may
still not be worth saving. Due to the uncertain nature of the current
statute’s requirements and the devastating consequences to claimants
of having their state-law claims dismissed without consideration on
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the merits,161 the statute should be replaced.162 This Part argues for
ways in which the legislature can dispense the present statute and
implement other measures to further the same legislative purposes
that were purportedly advanced with the current notice of claim
statute.
A. PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES
The notice of claim statute has been roundly criticized and
alternatives to its use have been offered in local scholarship. These
suggestions, however, are inadequate.
For example, in the Arizona State Law Journal, Andrew Becke
proposes two remedies for dealing with the problems associated with
the notice of claim statute.163 First, he suggests that the statute should
be eliminated for three reasons: the public entity or employee can
receive notice of the complaint through ordinary service and can
request additional information by way of the discovery process that
applies to normal litigants; opportunities to settle the claims may still
be present following the filing of a complaint; and the proper planning
and preparation for a suit can still be achieved when a public entity or
employee is served with a complaint.164
161

See supra notes 8, 11-14, and accompanying text.
One commentator challenges the statute and argues that it should be corrected for three
additional reasons:
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First, the time limit has become so short that the courthouse doors are closed to
many who do not quickly retain counsel. Second, the higher burden of detailed
facts required for a notice of claim creates difficulties for plaintiffs under time
pressure. Third, the requirement of a dollar figure for which the plaintiff will
settle forces injured parties to make assessments of damages with an incomplete
set of facts.
Becke, supra note 16, at 259; see id. at 263 (“A litigant ‘under the gun’ of the notice of claim
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While there may be benefits to repealing the statute entirely
and relying on the general complaint process instead, at least two
considerations indicate that doing so would likely be unfeasible. First,
the Arizona Constitution expressly permits the state legislature to
establish how the State may be sued; the Arizona Constitution thus
enables the state legislature to make it more difficult for litigants to
reach state defendants for the purposes of bringing a legal action.165
Second, state legislators are not only empowered to implement
roadblocks to state liability, but they have done so in an increasingly
rigorous ways.166 Accordingly, a recommendation that the legislature
eliminate the statute defies political realities and the legislative
history of the statute; these factors have indicated a willingness of the
legislature to protect to a greater degree state entities and actors from
suit.167
Second, and perhaps as a result of the likelihood that the
Arizona State Legislature will continue to exhibit that willingness,
Becke offers an additional suggestion: to implement a modified version
of the current notice of claim statute modeled after Maine’s notice of
claim statute.168 According to Becke, the Maine statute requires a
claimant to file a notice of claim within 180 days of a claim’s accrual,
though it allows a claimant to file a notice of claim anytime within the
generally applicable statute of limitations upon a showing of “good
cause.”169 The statute holds notices to a less stringent substantial
compliance standard; it excuses inaccuracies in notices unless the
government shows that it was prejudiced as a result of the
inaccuracies; and it prevents notices from being deemed inadequate
where a claim based on the same facts filed under a different statutory
procedure was disallowed.170
The Maine statute, examined on its own, may be an excellent
piece of legislation. Viewed in the context of Arizona’s historical and
increasingly rigid conception of notice of claim statutes, however, the
Maine statute appears too radical a shift in Arizona’s political climate.
private parties.”).
165
ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 18.
166
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167
See Nored v. City of Tempe, No. 08-00008, 2008 WL 2561905, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 26, 2008)
(“The trajectory of the Arizona legislature's position on this statute has been to strengthen and
specify the requirements of the statute.”).
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Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the Maine statute, as
described by Becke, does not seem to address some of the goals of the
Arizona statute, including the goal of ensuring that claimants do not
seek exaggerated monetary damages.171 Accordingly, the possibility
that a claimant may demand an inflated damages amount, and,
consequently, the possibility that the State will lack a meaningful
opportunity to settle the claims remains with the Maine statute.172
In light of this analysis, other proposals will need to be offered
that take into account the legislature’s apparent interest in making
State liability more difficult by way of enacting the notice of claim
procedural hurdle and that meets each of the legislative purposes of
the current statute.
B. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
The author’s proposal to fulfill the statutory objectives of the
current statute within the Arizona political environment while
ensuring that compliance is achieved with greater regularity, consists
of two parts: rewriting the notice of claim statute to make clearer
what is expected of claimants, and amending a rule of professional
conduct to curb overzealous attorney behavior with respect to demands
from the State.
As to the former, this author suggests that the notice of claim
statute be replaced with the following:
A. General: Persons who have claims under the Arizona Revised
Statutes for money damages against a public entity or a public
employee shall file notice of the claims with the respective public
entity and/or public employee prior to the initiation of legal action.
Notice shall be filed irrespective of whether the public entity or
public employee has actual or constructive notice of the claims.
B. Timing of Service: Notice shall be served within one-hundredeighty days after the cause of action accrues, except as provided by
this subsection. A cause of action accrues when the damaged party
realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably
should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality, or
condition which caused or contributed to the damage.
171
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See Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. Houser, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc).
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1. Any claim which must be submitted to a binding or
nonbinding dispute resolution process, an administrative
claims process or review process pursuant to a statute,
ordinance, resolution, administrative or governmental rule or
regulation, or contractual term shall not accrue for the
purposes of this subsection until all such procedures,
processes, or remedies have been exhausted. The time in
which to give notice of a potential claim and to sue on the
claim shall run from the date on which a final decision or
notice of disposition is issued in an alternative dispute
resolution procedure, administrative claim, or review
process. This provision shall not be construed to prevent the
parties to any contract from agreeing to extend the time for
filing such notice of claim.
2. A minor or an insane or incompetent person may file a
claim within one-hundred-eighty days after the disability
ceases.
C. Recipients of Service: Notice shall be served, pursuant to the
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, upon each public entity and each
public employee from which money damages are sought.
D. Substance of Notice: The notice shall contain:
1. A description of the facts giving rise to the claims such
that the public entity or public employee can discern the
relationship between the facts and the claims;
2. A settlement offer; and
3. An explanation of how the settlement figure was arrived
at such that the public entity or public employee can discern
the relationship between the facts and the settlement offer.
E. Effect of Non-Compliance: Any A.R.S. claim which is not filed in
accordance with this section is barred and no action may be
maintained thereon.
F. Ripeness: A claim against a public entity or public employee filed
in accordance with this section may be pursued in a court of
competent jurisdiction once denied. A claim is denied sixty days
after the filing of the claim unless the claimant is advised of the
denial in writing before the expiration of sixty days.
G. Application: This section shall apply to all causes of action which
accrue on or after the effective date of this section.
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This proposal addresses all but one of the purposes of the
existing notice of claim statute. First, the requirement that a claimant
provide notice to the public entity or employee ensures that the State
has notice of the claims, even if it has actual or constructive notice of
the claims.173 Second, the substantive requirements enable the State
to properly investigate the claims and assess its potential liability.174
Third, it provides the State with a meaningful opportunity to
determine whether it should accept the claimant’s settlement offer.175
Fourth, in evaluating the offer and any possible liability at trial, the
State is in a position to make financial preparations for a settlement or
damages award at trial.176
The proposed statute does not ease the service or substantive
requirements of the statute. The proposed statute, however, has the
added important advantage of providing clarity to the requirements of
the existing statute; thus, the statute helps to ensure compliance from
claimants who, up until this point, have encountered significant
difficulty in surpassing this procedural hurdle. This proposed statute
will also clean the slate of the legal landscape, in both the state and
federal realms, where rulings on the current notice of claim statute
have not resulted in reliable, predictable, or consistent treatment of
notices of claim. Accordingly, this proposed statute would increase the
possibility that the numerous people who have claims against public
entities or employees can have their allegations–which may be
weighty, as was the case of those brought by Jasper Simmons’
parents–judged on the merits rather than be dismissed out of hand.
There is one statutory purpose that the proposed statute does
not adequately address: the prevention of claimants from asking for
unrealistic or exaggerated settlement demands.177 As a result, the
second part of my proposal is to amend an existing rule of professional
conduct to ensure that attorneys practicing in Arizona do not seek to
subject the State to baseless settlement demands in a notice of claim.
Specifically, Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, entitled
“Meritorious Claims and Contentions,” presently provides, in relevant
part:
173
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See Yollin, 191 P.3d at 1045 & 1048; Deer Valley, 152 P.3d at 493.
175
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A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a good faith
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous,
which may include a good faith and nonfrivolous
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law.178
The proposed amendment to this rule would add a clause related to
notices of claim and would read:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, assert or
controvert an issue therein, or seek an unfounded
settlement demand from any public entity or employee,
unless there is a good faith basis in law and fact for doing
so that is not frivolous, which may include a good faith
and nonfrivolous argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law.
While the notice of claim statute permits the State to ascertain
whether a claimant’s settlement offer is reasonable, there is no
statutory constraint on claimants from demanding an unreasonable
amount from the State in a notice of claim. A statutory requirement
that a settlement offer be reasonable is unwise because it would
undoubtedly lead to legal disputes between a claimant and the State
regarding what is “reasonable.” Rather than provoke such “satellite
litigation,” a rule of professional conduct would provide an incentive for
attorneys to make certain that their clients’ settlement demands are
reasonable. If the State, through its own assessment of a settlement
offer and the factual basis for the offer, suspects that a represented
claimant has sought an unreasonable demand from the State, it may,
in a separate proceeding, seek to sanction the Arizona counsel.
Granted, this rule would not reach pro se claimants.179 It at
least, however touches those claimants with representation, whereas
the existing apparatus does not incentivize any claimants from
178
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demanding an unreasonable settlement sum from a public entity or
employee.
V. CONCLUSION
This discussion has aimed to explore two specific questions.
First, how can claimants comply with the existing notice of claim
statute?; Second, are there ways in which the statute may be
improved? It appears that compliance with the statute has proven
exceedingly difficult for claimants and that the courts have dismissed a
number of claims as a result. While the state and federal courts are in
agreement that notices are to be “strictly” construed, the courts’
application of this “strict” standard has not yielded consistent or
predictable results. In particular, the state courts have imposed a
relaxed standard with respect to the “facts-supporting” element of the
statute.
As a consequence, and unsurprisingly, federal courts
attempting to follow the state’s understanding of its own statute have
issued more rigid, and therefore unharmonious opinions.
This article has formulated a series of recommendations that, if
followed, should help claimants satisfy the notice of claim statute even
with the courts’ diverging views on the requirements of the statute and
the fact that other claimants have regrettably fallen short of the
statute’s demands. Though compliance may be made easier with these
suggestions, the notice of claim scheme itself is flawed, as
demonstrated by the courts’ failure to provide litigants with a coherent
understanding of what is required of them, and by the claimants’
inability to meet the statute’s commands even with counsel.
Accordingly, this article has proposed an amended statute that makes
clearer what each requirement means, such that claimants will be able
to achieve compliance with greater felicity, while simultaneously
upholding the statute’s underlying purposes. This amended statute
can be enacted despite the legislature’s attachment to the present
notice of claim framework.
The author recognizes that the guidance contained herein is not
exhaustive and does not include all of the solutions for issues with the
notice of claim statute. At a minimum, however, the author hopes that
the issues will be significant enough to provoke remedial action by
those in a position to ensure a prompt and comprehensive
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reexamination of the statute. In examining the history of the statute,
this article also has shown that the Arizona courts have repeatedly
invited the legislature to enter the thicket of sovereign immunity and
notices of claim.180 Given the identified problems with the statute, the
courts should again reach out to the legislature, this time urging their
colleagues to amend the problematic statute. Arizona’s own citizens
are struggling to obtain relief for wrongs allegedly committed by the
State. Their judicial counterparts similarly are plugging away case by
case, without much success, to figure out the meaning of the relevant
statutory terms.
This is the courts’ moment to acknowledge the statute’s
deficiencies and for the legislature to step in. Arizona litigants can
turn to this article for guidance in the meantime and relevant
stakeholders may consider the suggestions contained herein when and
if they decide to revisit the current statutory scheme.
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